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Earning and Caring
Abstract: This paper speaks especially to the family dimensions of equal opportunity. Defining
families through the activities of earning and caring, I first consider family change along with
explanations based on structural and cultural factors. I then make the case that equal
opportunity by gender has progressed considerably in education, while there are persistent
inequalities in unpaid work, and the inequalities in paid work can often be related to those in
unpaid work. By focussing on family models and the world of work, we see that various models
co-exist, but that several policies are based on the breadwinner model. The paper finishes with
reflections on policy that would de-link gender and caring.
Following on the tradition of John Porter (1921-1979), I focus here on issues of equality of
opportunity, by considering especially the family side of these questions. I start by making the
case that “earning and caring” are the important dimensions of families that we should be
studying. I then look at family change, and build a theoretical understanding based on economic
and cultural factors, or what Hamilton (1978) has called “patriarchy and capitalism.” I then look
at gender and associated differentials in the public world of education and work, but focus more
on the association of gender and caring, a topic that has been called a “stalled revolution.” In
reflecting further on slow gender change, I suggest that we need to pay attention to matters of
economic dependency and symbolic display in families. The consideration of family models and
the world of work suggests that policy should seek to de-link gender and caring.

Defining families
Defining families is a minefield. This can be observed by looking at the Cairo conference on
Population and Development, and the Beijing International Conference on Women. These
conferences might have elaborated some consensus thinking with regard to families, but that
proved impossible. At the heart of the problem is not only the diversity of families, but also the
conflicting orientations at the policy level. On the one hand, there is interest to support or
empower families, as a way of supporting individuals and children in particular. But sometimes
policy needs to support the removal of individuals from families, when these are oppressive or
abusive toward their members.
There has been a tendency to define families through relationships and through sentiment. In its
broadest definition, Statistics Canada speaks of people related by marriage or blood. We tend to
think of sentiment as the inner side of families, as what holds them together and makes them
unique and special. But family relationships have become very difficult to define, or at least
there is debate regarding what kind of relationships constitute families, and the focus on
sentiment can leave us blind to the negatives associated with families. There is not much
research on the public opinion of what constitutes families. My sense is that people living alone
resent the label of a non-family household, and they often see themselves as being in a family
situation. For instance, a French survey found that for persons who were single at ages 21-44, at
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least a quarter were in a serious relationship (Leridon and Villeneuve-Gokalp, 1994: 51). They
were not living with someone, but they considered that they were in a relationship. As another
example, the concept of step-parent or step-child is often given a stronger reality on the part of
sociologists than on the part of the persons who live these relationships, and who often think of
each other on a first name basis (McLanahan, 2000). The Dutch have asked respondents whether
they consider specific relationships to be families (Knijn, 2000). In response to a question “What
do you mean by a family,” besides couples with children, 96% saw “a man and a woman
cohabiting with children” as constituting a family, as did 81% for “two men living with an
adopted child,” and 81% for two women living together with a child of one of them.” There was
lesser recognition of families in the situation of “married partners without children,” at 56% and
only 43% for “cohabiting partners without children.”
Rather than defining families through relationships and sentiment, several authors have come to
define families through activities. In some early censuses, families, or households, were defined
as the people who regularly eat out of the same pot. In effect, eating is an important activity, as
is preparing the food; sharing food is a crucial part of caring, as is earning a living and
sometimes home production in order to purchase or obtain food and the other essentials of life.
We see this focus on activities in the lovely book by DeVault (1991) on Feeding the family, and
in the frequently quoted The Second Shift by Hochschild (1989). Smith (1997) has also used
these concepts when she speaks of families as “coordinating the uncoordinated.” In everyday
life, we each have our individual physical and social trajectories, it is family that brings us
together at specific times and places. I also like Smith’s view that, at least when there are
children, separation and divorce do not mark the end of relationships, but their moving into a
new stage.
Thus families can usefully be defined around the activities of earning and caring, or the sharing
in earning and caring. In important regards, families are people who mange together the central
life-maintaining activities of earning a living and caring for each other. At least families that do
not succeed to earn a living and care for each other are under significant stress. Thus, in the
General Social Survey on families, we should probably pay less attention to the “frequency of
visits and telephone contact,” and pay more attention to the financial transfers and the caring
activities, within and across households. We also should pay less attention to the specific nature
of relationships or forms of families, and more attention to the earning and caring links across
individuals who form families.

Family change: the 2nd demographic transition
The concept of the second demographic transition provides a useful context within which to
study family change over the past 40 years. If the first transition, from about 1870 to 1945,
brought smaller families, the change from about 1960 to the present is especially marked by
increased flexibility in marital relationships (Lesthaeghe, 1995; Beaujot, 2000a: 85-96). The first
transition involved a change in the economic costs and benefits of children, along with a cultural
environment that made it more appropriate to control family size. The second transition is
marked by a greater flexibility in the entry and exit from relationships, as manifest especially
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through cohabitation and divorce.
There is considerable similarity in the timing of the second transition in a number of Western
countries. Lesthaeghe (1995) proposes that it is useful to consider three stages in this second
transition. The first stage, from about 1960 to 1970 involved the end of the baby boom, the end
of the trend toward younger ages at marriage, and the beginning of the rise in divorces. The
second stage from 1970 to 1985 saw the growth of common law unions and eventually of
children in cohabiting unions. The third stage since 1985 includes a plateau in divorce, an
increase in post-marital cohabitation (and consequently a decline in re-marriage), and a plateau
in fertility due in part to higher proportions of births after age thirty. There are clearly cultural
differences in the extent to which given groups have completed the second demographic
transition. For instance, cultural factors played a significant role in the delay of the first
transition among the French population of Canada, which underwent pronounced change in the
1960s as the completion of the first transition coincided with the beginning of the second. By the
1990s, the population of Quebec was more advanced than that of Ontario in several aspects of
the second demographic transition (Beaujot, 2000b).
---Table 1 about here--Table 1 presents some statistics that capture these trends for Canada as a whole. In terms of the
first stage, the average births per woman, as measured by the total fertility rate, reached a peak
of 3.9 in 1957, and declined to 2.2 by 1971. The median age at first marriage declined over this
century to reach a low of just over 21 years for brides and 23 years for grooms in the early
1970s, then increased to ages 26 and 28 for women and men respectively by 1996. The law
permitting divorces on grounds other than adultery dates only from 1968. Per 100,000 married
couples, there were under 200 divorces in each year over the period 1951-1966 compared to
1000 in 1976 and 1130 in 1996. While there had been a long term increase in separation and
divorce, we can speak of a substantial jump starting in the 1960s. Although most marriages
remain intact until death, the substantial increase in separations means that marriage is no longer
defined as lasting forever.
Turning to the second stage, cohabiting unions were not specifically enumerated in the 1976
Census, but births to non-married women were increasing substantially in the 1970s, giving an
indirect measure of common-law unions. By 1986, most tabulations on families were treating
cohabitations as marriages. The 1996 Census determined that 13.7 per cent of couples were
cohabiting. The 1995 General Social Survey found that among persons born between 1951 and
1970, two out of five have lived in a cohabiting union, and over half of first unions taking place
since 1985 have been cohabitations rather than marriages (Dumas and Bélanger, 1997: 135,
139). The proportion of births occurring to women who are not married, most of whom are
cohabiting, increased from 9 per cent in 1971 to 37 per cent in 1996. At first cohabitation was
seen as mostly affecting pre-marital relationships, but we now see that it has also affected postmarital relationships, along with marital relationships themselves. In effect, along with
separation and divorce, it is a key indicator of family change.
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For the third stage, we find that by 1990, half of divorced persons aged 30-39, and more than a
third of those aged 40-49, were in cohabiting relationships (Dumas and Péron, 1992: 50). There
is relatively stable fertility, between 1.7 to 1.5 births per woman over the whole period 1977 to
1998, but the proportion of the total fertility rate to women aged 30 and over has increased from
24.9 per cent in 1976 to 40.2 per cent in 1998.
These changes in births, marriage, cohabitation and divorce have brought fewer children, but
also a higher proportion of children who are not living with both biological parents. In particular,
lone-parent families as a proportion of all families with children increased from 11.4 in 1961 to
22.3 in 1996. Compared to men, women are less likely to be living in a relationship, and they are
more likely to be living with children. Both of these differences present economic disadvantages
for women, and for children.
These data also confirm the uniqueness of the 1950s as a period between the two transitions. Not
only was this the peak of the baby boom, but it was also a period of marriage rush, as marriage
occurred at young ages and high proportions of persons married at least once in their lives. It has
been described as a "golden age of the family," where many families corresponded to the new
ideal of domesticity, especially in the suburbs, and consequently there was less variability
(Skolnick, 1987: 6-16).
Subsequent research has made it clear that not all was ideal in this golden age. Isolated
housewives in particular experienced the "problem with no name" (Freidan, 1963: 15). Since the
task of maintaining the home had been assigned to women, men became less competent at the
social skills needed to nourish and maintain relationships (Goldscheider and Waite, 1991: 19).
The idealism of the time also introduced blinkers regarding some realities of family life,
including violence and abuse. Given a general denial that such things could ever occur in
families, there was little recourse for the victims of violence. There was also a lack of autonomy,
especially for women, to pursue routes other than the accepted path (Veevers, 1980). Childless
couples were considered selfish, single persons were seen as deviants, working mothers were
considered to be harming their children, single women who became pregnant were required
either to marry or to give up the child for adoption in order to preserve the integrity of the
family. For instance, in the 1950s four out of five Americans described persons who did not
marry as neurotic, selfish or immoral (Kersten and Kersten, 1991; Wilson, 1990: 99). In
hindsight, we can observe that there were pent-up problems that were preparing the way for the
second transition starting in the 1960s.

Family change: delay of life course transitions
We can speak of family change in terms of greater looseness in the entry and exit from
relationships, and thus the importance of separation and cohabitation as indicators of this change.
We can also speak of a shift in the average timing of family events, toward later ages. For
childbearing, the first transition saw a reduction of births at older ages, but the second transition
has involved a tempo shift or a delay of births to older ages.
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There are similar delays in several other family events. Using data from the 1995 General Social
Survey, Ravanera and her colleagues found rather uniform patterns in the median ages at which
various family life course events have occurred (Ravanera and Rajulton, 1996; Ravanera et al.,
1998a and 1998b). Over the birth cohorts 1916-20 to 1941-45 there as a general downward
trend in the age at home leaving, first marriage, first birth, last birth and home leaving of the
children. Conversely, the subsequent cohorts have experienced an upward trend. In the cohorts
of the 1920s to 1940s, the tendency was not only to marry early, but over a relatively narrow
range of ages.
The delays in these life course events may be interpreted as a longer period of adolescence,
which Côté and Allahar (1994) have called a Generation on Hold. But the delays also reflect the
needs of both men and women to put off the entry into relationships, and especially childbearing,
until they are better able to handle the trade-offs between investing in themselves and investing
in reproduction. That is, there are trade-offs in the timing of the various life course transitions,
with advantages to both early and late patterns. Early childbearing ensures that there will be
childbearing and early departures from the parental home ensure that the child has somehow
become independent. However, those who have children later are able to invest longer in
themselves before investing in the next generation, and they are able to have higher quality
children. Similarly, later home leaving can enable better transfers from parents, and the potential
to establish more effective self-sufficiency of children.
In effect, Lochhead (2000) finds that delayed childbearing is more pronounced among women
who have university education, and that there are increasing income differentials to the
disadvantage of younger first-time mothers, even in two-parent families. Using data from the
United States, Martin (2000) finds that delayed childbearers, who tend to have more education,
are increasingly likely to raise their children in intact marriages, while early childbearers are
more likely to raise children outside of marriage. Canadian data also indicate that women under
30 who are formerly married are much more likely to have children than those who are single,
cohabiting or married (Ravanera, 1995: 18). From the point of view of children, Bianchi (2000)
speaks of a possible bifurcation of models, with one group taking advantage of parental
investment from both mothers and fathers, and the other where fathers are more likely to be
absent and mothers do not have adequate time and resources to invest in children. Children born
from mature parents are more likely to have the advantages of a mother with more human
capital, along with the presence of a father in a dual-income family, which contrasts with the
greater likelihood of lone parenthood for those who parent early.

Family change: structural and cultural explanations
As in other areas of sociology, it is possible to get some mileage by starting with structural and
cultural perspectives. I have always liked Hamilton’s (1978) title, The Liberation of women: a
study of patriarchy and capitalism as a means of highlighting these theoretical questions.
The long term changes in the family are related to societal changes, especially changes in
5

economic structures. We can speak of structural differentiation, and de-institutionalization,
through which families has become less central to the organization of society and to the lives of
individuals (Harris, 1983). This reduced role allows for more flexibility in family arrangements
and fewer constraints on family behaviour. For instance, the growth of wage labour for the
young undermined parental authority and removed the barriers to early marriage. Note that in
some other areas of life there have emerged more constraints on behaviour, for instance with
regard to smoking in public places, throwing out garbage, or sexually abusive behaviour at work.
That is, not all areas of life have seen the diminished constraints on individual behaviour that we
have seen in the family area.
In terms of the more recent transformations, the structural explanation pays attention to the shift
to a service economy which increased the demand for women's involvement in paid work
(Chafetz and Hagan, 1996). Until the 1960s, the division of labour encouraged a reciprocal state
of dependency between the sexes. The expansion that occurred in the labour market as of the
1960s involved especially jobs that might be seen as extensions of women's unpaid work,
particularly in clerical work, teaching, nursing and other services. This put pressure on women to
postpone marriage as they extended their period of education and invested in their work lives.
For both young women and young men, marriage became less important as a means of
structuring their relationships and understandings, and consequently cohabitation became an
alternative. Women became less dependent on marriage, making divorce and cohabitation more
feasible alternatives for both sexes. Focussing on men, Mintz (1998) observes not only the long
term disappearance of patriarchal families based on father-son bonds, but especially the demise
of the family wage and consequently the decline in the material basis of male familial authority.
The cultural explanations focus on what is happening within families, on the understanding that
people have regarding family questions. Burgess et al. (1963) spoke of a movement from
institution to companionship, or Farber (1964) from orderly replacement of generations to
permanent availability, or Scanzoni and Scanzoni (1976) from instrumental to expressive
relationships. As is well recognized, relationships based on companionship are less stable than
those based on division of labour. Relationships are not maintained as institutions, but as a
“project de couple” (Roussel, 1979), or as a “pure relationship” (Giddens, 1991). In Le fin de la
famille moderne, Dagenais (2000) also describes the post-modern family as high in individual
and humanistic values.
Lesthaeghe (1995) has proposed that it is possible to identify two somewhat separable cultural
transformations in terms of family, intimate behaviour and children, with the second
corresponding to the second demographic transition. He notes that several authors have proposed
these themes. For instance, in The Making of the Modern Family, Shorter (1975) identifies two
sexual revolutions. The first revolution involved young people making their own personal
choices for marriage partners, and consequently the removal of the barriers to marriage that had
previously been placed by parents and society. However, this first revolution was based on “one
true love” that was expected to last a lifetime. The second sexual revolution accentuated the
sexual aspects of mate selection and introduced experimentation with eroticism along with the
possibility of sex without love. Eventually, sexual gratification was seen as indispensable for
6

unions.
There are also two contraceptive revolutions. The first transition occurred before modern
methods of contraception. These were inefficient methods, including abstinence and non-coital
sex. This first contraceptive revolution occurred quietly, in the privacy of individual couples who
sought to stop childbearing after they had the desired number of children. The second
contraceptive revolution involved efficient methods, principally the pill and sterilization. This
was far from a quiet revolution in the privacy of married couples. In particular, it liberated premarital sexual activities from the concerns of pregnancy, and allowed people to enter
relationships earlier. Efficient contraception also permitted the postponement of births and strong
control over the timing of children. For couples, perhaps nothing has changed as much since the
early 1960s as the degree of control over childbearing. For the non-married, there was a
significant reduction in the risks of sexual expression. In both cases, the links between sexuality,
marital life and reproduction have been broken.
Ariès (1980) also speaks of two transitions in the relative priority given to children and adults.
The first transition centred on children, with strong parental investments in child quality. Earlier,
children seemed to be present for the benefit of parents, but later parents came to spoil their
children in the sense of giving them more than they could ever expect in return (Caldwell, 1976).
Similarly, while many things had previously competed for a mother's attention, maternal love
came to put children's well-being second to none, and motherhood even emerged as a full-time
vocation (Shorter, 1975; Stone, 1977; Garfield, 1990: 37). The second transition involves a move
to adult-centred preoccupations involving self-fulfilment and the quality of the dyadic relation
between partners. There is a shift in values and norms from family or child-centred orientations
toward more self-centred pursuits (Ariès, 1980; Lesthaeghe, 1983; Roussel, 1987). In particular,
the second transition involves a weakening of the normative consensus that marriage and
childbearing are integral parts of the adult role. Instead, children are largely viewed as a means
through which adults can receive affective gratification and blossom as individuals (Romaniuc,
1984: 64). Of course, some have concluded that children can also interfere with this affective
individualism. While children remain important for most people, they are no longer so important
as to be impediments to parental divorce, and subsequent self-fulfilment in other relationships.
Lesthaeghe (1995) further identifies two transitions in terms of individual autonomy and
political control. The period until 1950 involved enhanced institutional control, first by the
church through the reform movements and then by the state through an extension of its power
over individual lives. As the study of prevalent values indicates, the more recent period has
involved a resistance to external institutional authority. There were the student movements of the
1960s, the second wave of feminism in the 1970s, and the decline of deference of the 1980s. In
regard to the latter, Nevitte (1996: 226) finds that in 1980 some 53 percent of Canadians thought
that “tolerance and respect for other people” was an important “quality which children should be
encouraged to learn at home.” By 1990, 80 percent of respondents choose tolerance as a key
value for children to learn. In the twelve countries surveyed in the 1980 and 1990 World Values
Survey, there were increases over the period in the value placed on egalitarianism in both
husband/wife and parent/child relationships (Nevitte, 1996: 280). For women in particular,
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asymmetric gender roles are questioned as limitations on both achievement and self-fulfilment.
Clearly, family change has much to do with gender. In order to highlight these gender questions,
the next sections adopt categories proposed by Jean-Claude Chesnais (1987) to the effect that
moving toward gender equality involves equal opportunity (1) in education, (2) in the labour
force and (3) in everyday life.

Gender and education
It is not hard to demonstrate that there has been much change in terms of gender and education.
In 1960 only a quarter of post-secondary students were women, now 56% are women. Table 2
shows degrees, diplomas and certificates granted by field of study and sex for the period 1970 to
1995, separating the undergraduate and graduate levels. In several fields, women have become
the majority. At the undergraduate level, there are two areas where women remain in the
minority: in engineering and applied sciences the progress is slow such that only 21% of degrees
were granted to women in 1995, and in mathematics/physical sciences we might speak of
proportions that are stalled at some 30% women since 1980.
—Table 2 about here—
Without considering all the reasons for this change or lack of change, part of the explanation
may relate to the extent to which various professions have become family friendly. When there
are few women in a field, as in engineering or physical sciences, there may be less pressure to
adopt family friendly provisions. Thus a circularity may exist wherein certain professions are
slow at adopting family friendly orientations because the workers are mostly men, which in turn
discourages women from entering the field. In other fields like education or health, where
women have become the majority, the workers may have sought benefits that made more
accommodations between family and work (Ranson, 1998).

Gender and work
The labour force participation patterns of women and men have become more similar, but there
remain differences in levels and intensity (Beaujot, 2000a: 144). The employment/population
ratios have become more similar, with women’s rate representing 63.4% of men’s rate in 1980
and 82.2% in 2000 (Table 3). A greater proportion of women are working part-time, but parttime work is also increasing for men. Consequently, the full-time employment to population
ratios have also converged. For instance, at ages 25-44 the full-time employment to population
ratio was reduced for men from 88.4% in 1980 to 82.7% in 2000. For women, this ratio
increased from 44.4% to 59.2%. At the same time, the full-time hours have not converged,
representing 44.0 hours for men and 39.4 hours for women in 2000. The earnings ratios are on a
converging path, but the differences remain large.
—Table 3 about here--8

There is both continuity and change, depending on the indicator. In 1976, women comprised
only 40% of managers and professionals (white collar workers), compared to over half in 1996
(Beaujot, 2000a: 147). On the other hand, while women are 45% of the labour force, they
comprise only 12% of “power jobs” (corporate officer positions in Canada’s 560 largest
corporations) and only 3.4% of “clout positions” (executive vice-presidents and chief executive
officers in these largest corporations) (Church, 2000).
Earnings ratios are less pronounced at younger ages. At ages 25-34, the 1998 hourly earnings
ratio of women was 92% of that of men if they were single, and 96% if they were unionized
workers (Galarneau and Earl, 1999: 26). While marital status and parental status have come to
play lesser roles, they continue to operate in opposite directions in the lives of men and women.
That is, for women, being married and having children reduces the labour force participation, but
for men being married and having children increases the labour force participation.
Consequently, the smallest sex differences are for persons who are single without children and
the largest differences are for the married with children (Beaujot, 1995).
Among couples with children under 16, there were dual-earners in 36% of cases in 1961
compared to 62% in 1997 (Marshall, 1998: 10). There are also more cases of wives earning more
than their husbands; among husband-wife families with employment income, 25% had wives
with higher income in 1993, compared to 11% in 1967 (Crompton and Geran, 1995). In a third
of these cases, the wives were sole earners. However, in the combined average incomes of
husbands and wives, wives contributed 16.2% in 1970 and 30.5% in 1990 (Rashid, 1994: 9).
Even when wives worked full-year full-time, their average income only comprised 40% of
average family income. When husbands have incomes over $30,000, the likelihood of the wife
working no longer drops off as the husband’s income increases (Rashid, 1994: 16, 17). At the
same time, when husbands are under 40 years of age, the incomes of husbands are lower in dualearner than one-earner families (Oderkirk et al., 1994).
Equal opportunity in education has largely arrived, and it has also advanced in terms of work,
but this is complicated by family questions. It is by looking at paid and unpaid work together that
we can get a better sense of the situation.

Gender and everyday life
In their book entitled Lives of their own: the individualization of women’s lives, Jones and his
co-authors (1990) see a change toward greater alternatives and flexibility in women’s lives. On
the other hand, Duffy and her co-authors (1989) entitle their book, Few choices: women, work
and family. If the choice is to work full-time, that often comes with time stress, especially when
there are young children. The housekeeper alternative presents the disadvantage of isolation and
low status, The intermediate alternative of part-time work can lead to a lack of seniority and few
work benefits.
We have much poorer statistics on unpaid work than on education and paid work, making it
difficult to measure change. Nonetheless, change can be implied by comparing two articles in the
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Canadian Review of Sociology and Anthropology. Based on a 1971 time use study in
Vancouver, Meissner et al. (1975) entitled their article “No exit for wives: sexual division of
labour and the cumulation of household demands.” Qualitative quotes illustrate men’s attitudes
wives as co-providers (Meissner et al., 1975: 438-439):
A forklift driver in his mid-fifties, whose wife works two days a week as a switchboard
operator (three children, aged 13 to 22), had this to say on the conditions of sharing
housework: "If a woman has to work, then the husband and wife should share the
housework, but if it isn't necessary for her to work then she should consider looking after
the house first. It isn't necessary for her to work in the first place. She's doing this for
herself and to satisfy herself, where the man has to work to keep the house going."
A manager in his mid-thirties whose wife is a full-time housewife (three children, aged 7
to 14), on the hypothetical question of his wife taking a job: "I wouldn't stand in her way,
if that's what she wanted to do, but fortunately for me she doesn't want to do that. My
wife's first priority should be the family and the home as long as I am able to provide for
the family."
A lawyer in his late forties whose wife has just quit a part-time professional job because
the double burden was too much (three children, aged 15 to 19), about the sharing of
housework: "If the guy comes home completely beat because he's got a job of much more
pressure and his wife has a job because she's bored with the housework, this gives her a
lift and she's more up to doing the housework."
These attitudes now appear rather archaic, as do those of men in Flin Flon Manitoba in the mid1970s, captured so well by Luxton’s (1980) title, More than a labour of love. In contrast Bernier
et al. (1996) entitled their Canadian Review of Sociology and Anthropology study “Le travail
domestique: tendances à la désexisation et à la complexification.” Based on data from Sudbury
in 1993-94, the analysis of domestic work by age, education, occupation and the relative income
of spouses, suggests to these authors that women’s paid work was a “trump card” against their
exploitation through domestic work. Looking toward the future, Bernier and her co-authors
propose that greater labour force participation, along with fewer children, should further reduce
the gender differences in housework. The contrast is highest in the qualitative parts of the studies
from Vancouver in 1971 and Sudbury in 1993-94. While the Meissner study concludes that there
is “no exit for wives,” Bernier et al. note a reduction of the inequality in the sharing of domestic
work across various types of couples. Based on their data from Hamilton in 1984, Livingstone
and Asner (1996) find that the gender differences in domestic work are lowest in professional
dual-earner couples who are intermediate in the class structure.
Besides these local surveys, we now have three national level time-use surveys, for 1986, 1992
and 1998. These are based on time-use diaries where respondents are asked to indicate their
activity over a specific 24-hour day. This measures only the main activity for given times of the
day. That is, double tasking is not measured, nor the intensity of the activity, nor the extent to
which the respondent takes responsibility for a given task. When responsibility for domestic
10

tasks is studied, it clearly shows that women absorb the chief responsibility for the main
domestic tasks (Beaujot, 2000a: 215), but such tabulations typically do not pay attention to the
relative responsibility of men for earning or paid work. The advantage of time-use calendars is
that time provides a common metric, especially for measuring both paid and unpaid work. There
are also advantages to recording the specific activities performed over the day, rather than
having respondents estimate the time spent on given activities, or their share of the responsibility
for given tasks. Since there is considerable variation from day to day for specific respondents,
averages for categories of the population can be more useful than multivariate analyses based on
individual responses.
While much more detail is available, it is useful to divide the total 24-hour day for each
respondent into four categories. Time use in paid work here includes driving to and from work,
and it also includes time spent in education. Unpaid work is all other work, including housework,
child care and even volunteer work, performed as a main activity at given times of the day.
These two together can be called total productive time. In contrast, the other two categories are
down time: personal care including sleeping and caring for oneself, along with leisure and free
time which includes active and passive forms of leisure.
All three surveys show an important result: for the total population aged 15 and over, the average
productive time of men and women is very similar. In 1998, the average was exactly the same at
7.8 hours per day over a seven day week, for women and men (Figure 1). The asymmetry is in
terms of the division of this time into the paid and unpaid components. Nonetheless, there has
been some convergence (Table 4). As would be expected, women’s time in paid work as a
percent of men’s time in paid work has increased from 60% in 1986, to 65% in 1992, and 68% in
1998. Conversely, men’s time in unpaid work as a percent of women’s time in unpaid work has
also changed from 46% in 1986, to 58% in 1992, and 61% in 1998. In 1986 we could say that
men did a third and women two-thirds of unpaid work, or women did twice as much as men.
This generalization is no longer true, with men doing 61% as much unpaid work as women, and
women doing 68% as much paid work as men.
—Figure 1 and Table 4 about here—
Marital status and the presence of children influence the total time in productive activities and
the distribution into paid and unpaid components (Table 5). At ages 25-44 in 1998, the greatest
gender symmetry can be observed for those who are unmarried (neither married nor cohabiting)
with no children. In this category, there is less than an hour of difference between men and
women in the average hours per day in each of paid and unpaid work. Compared to the category
of unmarried without children, married without children increases the total productive time for
both men and women, but it also brings more asymmetry, with the increase being in the category
of paid work for men and unpaid work for women. Children further increase the total productive
time for both sexes, but this increase is all in the unpaid work category, and especially for
women.
—Table 5 about here—
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It is noteworthy that, except for lone parents, the average time in total productive activity is very
similar between men and women within these categories of marital and parental status for the
population aged 25-44. Nonetheless, both marriage and children, but especially children, bring
change in the direction of greater complementary or specialization. The further consideration of
the work status confirms that women make greater adjustments for changing family situations,
but men also do more unpaid work when there are young children (Beaujot, 2000a: 211). As
Kempeneers (1992) had observed through looking at work interruptions, women carry more of
the responsibility for the necessary accommodations between production and reproduction.

The stalled revolution?
It is useful to contrast two explanations of the division of paid and unpaid work. Becker (1981)
basically proposes that specialization is more efficient, and consequently, in a given household,
at most one person would be both in the labour market and in domestic production. Hartmann
(1984) attributes the division of work to men’s exploitation of women’s labour, within
patriarchy. Both of these authors were looking at the situation of American families in the 1950s
or 1960s, and neither saw much potential for change. Both theories, it seems to me, are overdeterministic. Becker was wrong in concluding that efficiency would be the prime consideration,
while Hartmann was wrong in suggesting that men would not accommodate to the presence of
children and the partner’s paid work time.
At stake are questions of both dependency and gender display (Brines, 1994). Durkheim (1960
[1893]: 60) had elevated dependency to a universal principal, suggesting that without a division
of labour, marriages would be transient. He saw complementary roles as a basis for holding
families together, and thought that if we “permit the sexual division of labour to recede below a
certain level ... conjugal society would eventually subsist in sexual relations preeminently
ephemeral.” The concept of “gender display” suggests instead a cultural basis on which men and
women differ, with men being threatened in their very masculinity by doing domestic work.
Given the powerful economic and cultural questions underlying the complementary roles model,
it is understandable that gender change in the area of domestic work has been slow.
Nonetheless, there are powerful economic and cultural forces pushing in the opposite direction,
especially women’s labour market opportunities, and the cultural interest in greater equality by
gender. Thus, in his article on “The future of fatherhood,” Coltrane (1995) observes various
pressures for change, including economic ones with more time in paid work by wives and greater
commitment to women as full-time providers, and cultural questions like new ideals of sharing,
less rigid gender attitudes, and men taking pride in their ability to do domestic work and being
involved fathers. Other life course changes are pushing in the same direction, with more sharing
associated with cohabitation, remarriage and later births, where women are in a better position to
negotiate the division of costs. The breadwinner/ homemaker form of division of paid and unpaid
work made more sense when domestic production was a full-time job, with large families and
few support services.

Family models and the world of work
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The study of family models has paid much attention to the transition from a breadwinner model
to dual-earner families. Thus it is important to analyse the extent of accommodation between
families and the world of work.
When the focus is on domestic work, the literature is prone to conclude that the change has been
from the homemaking model to women having a double burden. That is, the change in women’s
labour force participation has not been accompanied by an equal change in the division of unpaid
work, giving women a second shift. While these are clearly important family models, they can
mask other distinctions and changes with regard to the division of paid and unpaid work. In
particular, there has been a tendency to ignore the remaining differential involvement of
husbands and wives in paid work, and to conclude too readily that the lack of change in men’s
unpaid work implies a second shift in the sense of women having more total (paid plus unpaid)
work than men. Sullivan (2000) observes that concepts such as double burden, second shift or
stalled revolution have contributed to the understanding of the division of domestic work and
related issues of power, but these ideas correspond to a “no change” model that tends to ignore
the potential for and possibilities of change. On the basis of American data from 1965 and 1998,
Sayer (2002) finds that the relation between time-use and gender has changed since the 1960s.
Men have increased their time in core nonmarket tasks (cooking, cleaning, and daily child care),
marriage increases housework for both women and men, and both married mothers and married
fathers of young children are putting in a second shift of work. She concludes that nonmarket
work may be shifting from representing gender subordination to representing family caring.
Besides the double burden, it is useful to contrast a Durkheim/Parsons/Becker model based on
complementary roles associated with differential responsibility for instrumental and expressive
activities, and a companionship or collaborative model. Companionship refers to the relationship
being held together through expressive activities. In a collaborative model, men and women are
collaborating in providing and caring roles; if there are children it may be seen as co-providing
and co-parenting. Goldscheider and Waite (1991) have expressed these ideas about family
models in their title New families, No families? That is, they contrast old families based on
complementary roles to new families where activities are shared. Similarly, Conway (1997)
speaks of a “joyous funeral” for the patriarchal family based on complementary roles. Depending
on the relative opportunity structure of women and men, the collaborative model provides
insurance against the inability or unwillingness of the breadwinner to provide for (especially
former) spouse and children.
While the definitions are not totally clear, it is important to address the empirical question of the
relative predominance of various family models. In the breadwinner or neo-traditional
arrangement, the man takes more responsibility for paid work and the woman for unpaid work.
In the double burden, both are equally involved in paid work but the women does more of the
unpaid work. By not observing the relative amount of paid work done by men and women,
much research is unable to distinguish between neo-traditional and second shift arrangements
(Becker and Williams, 1999). The focus on averages at the aggregate level, either for all
couples, or for dual-earner couples, does not permit a consideration of cases of “new families”
where the unpaid work is more equally divided, or situations where men work significantly
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longer hours than women.
In identifying the collaborative model, several authors have adopted at 40/60 split as marking an
equal division. Schwartz (1994) used this 40/60 split of labour and responsibility to identify what
she called “peer couples.” Nock (2001) defines “marriages of equally dependent spouses” as
those where neither spouse earns less than 40 percent of total family earnings. Looking only at
two-earner couples, Feree (1991) identifies the “two-housekeeper” model as the wife doing less
than 60 percent and the husband more than 40% of the housework. Similarly, Sullivan (2000)
defines egalitarian couples as those where the woman does less than 60% of the overall domestic
work time.
In my earlier work, couples were identified as doing the same amount of either paid or unpaid
work if they were within four hours of each other in one week (Beaujot, 2000a: 224-226; Beaujot
and Liu, 2001a). Four hours, or slightly more than a half hour per day, is a fairly stringent
measure because it comprises only 15% of total weekly paid or unpaid work. In the present
analysis, a relative share was used. The 40/60 split that others have adopted is rather generous,
because the person doing the larger amount can be doing as much as 50% more than the person
doing the smaller amount. Instead, Table 6 uses the range of 45% to 55% of the couple total on
a given type of work as “same,” while under 45% is doing less than the spouse, and over 55% is
doing more than the spouse.
—Table 6 about here--The data used here are from the weekly estimates of the time-use survey, where we have
estimates for both the respondent and their spouse. These estimates adopt a less inclusive
definition of paid and unpaid work, there is also more estimation error, and there is significant
non-response especially for the questions regarding the spouse, but the measures have the
advantage of enabling comparisons within couples. The questions concerned the total weekly
time spent in paid work, domestic work, household maintenance, and child care, for the
respondent and their spouse. These separate measures have been collapsed into the two
categories of weekly paid and unpaid work.
Compared to one’s spouse, one could be doing more, less or the same amount of each of paid
and unpaid work. It is of interest to first observe that there are couples in each of the cells of this
three-by-three table (Table 6). From these nine categories, it is possible to suggest three types of
work arrangements. In the traditional or complementary roles model, one person does more
paid work and the other more unpaid work, and it is also useful to observe the sub-category of
cases where it is the man who does more unpaid work and less paid work. In the double
burden, a given person does the same amount (or even more) paid work, and more unpaid work.
Here again, the double burden can be on the part of women or men. We can classify persons in a
collaborative or more egalitarian model where both do the same amount of unpaid work. While
this gives predominance to unpaid work in defining an egalitarian model, it does correspond to
the literature on unpaid work, and it is possible to further specify the specific cases where
spouses are doing similar hours of each of paid and unpaid work.
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The dominant category, amounting to 57% in 1992 and 54% in 1998, are couples where one
spends more time at paid work and the other spends more time at unpaid work. Within this
complementary roles model, there are 7% of the cases in 1992 and 10% in 1998 showing the
man doing more unpaid work and the woman doing more paid work. The second largest
category is the double burden where typically a given person is doing the same amount of paid
work but more unpaid work. This corresponds to 31% of the sample in 1992 and 33% in 1998;
in 25% of these cases in 1992 and 30% in 1998 it was men who had the double burden. The
remaining 12% of the sample in 1992 and 13% in 1998 can be called a collaborative model,
including 4.7% in 1992 and 5.7% in 1998 where they do the same amount of both paid and
unpaid work. As indicated, the comparisons between 1992 and 1998 show only slight change,
but this tends to be in the direction of somewhat greater symmetry, with slight reduction in
complementary roles and a greater proportion of men among persons with a double burden.
Further analysis suggests that the traditional model is most common when they are not both
employed full-time, for older respondents, and when there are children under five years of age
(Beaujot and Liu, 2001a). The double burden is most common when both are employed fulltime, in older couples, and when the children are aged 5-18. The egalitarian model is most
common at younger ages, when both are employed full-time, and for couples with children.
Contrary to expectations, the egalitarian model is not more common in couples without children,
though the traditional model does systematically increase with the number of children.
These family models are related to the changes in the work world, especially the growth of the
service sector, larger proportions of non-standard jobs, more equal opportunity by gender, and
employment/ population ratios that are at an all time high. It could be argued that this greater
supply of workers relative to the population, including various kinds of workers with family
responsibilities, has been one of the factors bringing change in the nature of work, including
what has been called non-standard work (part-time, temporary, multiple jobs, own-account selfemployment, etc). In some regards there is less security at work, but there is also more variety in
the types of work, and a higher proportion of workers relative to the population. Presser (1998)
proposes that this greater supply of workers of various types is one of the factors underlying a 24
hour economy, which permits a certain accommodation between family and work through parttime work, shifts, and longer hours for retail services. That is, the 24 hour economy, with
associated growth of non-standard employment, includes changes at work, in families, and in the
relations between family and work.

Policy thoughts
Policy probably needs to work at three fronts. It is important to seek to achieve more individual
self sufficiency. It is also important to have families that look after individuals, and it is
important to have a broader social safety net. As in any difficult policy area, there are
contradictions. In particular, the encouragement of families to look after individuals can
undermine the self-sufficiency of the person who takes the largest responsibility for this care.
Becker (1981) sees marriage laws as existing to protect women who have specialized in unpaid
work. But might we structure policy in order to discourage dependency on the part of adults, and
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thus focus family policy toward children, who are necessarily dependent.
The complexity of policy derives in part because various family models co-exist. Clearly, there
needs to be support for those who have lived their lives under the assumptions of the
breadwinner or neo-traditional patterns. At the same time, it is my thesis that the de-gendering of
caring activities is important to achieving equality of opportunity. Thus there is need both to
support persons who have been disadvantaged through the breadwinner model, and to promote a
more egalitarian family model that includes greater common ground between women and men in
family activities.
There is clearly some basis for “new families” including policies like the Ontario Family Law
Reform Act which already in 1978 spoke of couples sharing equally in the responsibility for
their children. However, in many regards, there is resistence to letting women and men into
domains that are considered to belong to the other gender. This is seen in paid work, with glass
ceilings and the rarity of cases where women have authority over men (Clement and Myles,
1994). It is also seen within the home, where women can have difficulty allowing men to take
responsibility in their domain. At stake are not only questions of paid and unpaid work, but the
sense of mastery and indebtedness that may come from carrying a larger part of the burden
(Lennon and Rosenfeld, 1992). These turf questions may especially apply within specific
occupations and types of domestic work, and they may even apply to sub-areas of academic
disciplines. There is need to think of ways of opening up these domains to the other sex, of men
accepting that women may have different ways of supervising, and women accepting that men
may have different standards of domestic work. Can we look toward a world where caring is just
as important as earning, and where women and men let each other into both spheres?
Without doing justice to the whole domain of family policy, I will focus here on avenues that
might help with regard to the de-linking of gender and caring. One problem is that many policies
are based on a family wage model, which promotes dependency of one spouse on the other rather
than self-sufficiency. Clearly, the family wage model gives the dependent spouse a greater share
in the responsibility for caring. In particular, it would seem that a policy model that wanted to
increase the common ground in terms of dependence and self-sufficiency of women and men
would seek to put aside family benefits from employment along with spousal deductions in
income tax, it would put aside widowhood benefits in pensions when the breadwinner dies, as
well as alimony and pension splitting when the breadwinner separates, and it would seek to
ensure joint custody of children. All of these things, from family benefits, to taxation, to pension
splitting are based on a breadwinner model where one spouse is economically dependent on the
other. It is interesting, for instance, that Sweden has never had pension splitting, it has the
default condition of joint custody, and it did away with widow's pensions for those who married
since 1989. A series of Swedish policies are based on the assumption that adults should be
independent rather than dependent.
But even Sweden has not gone far enough in terms of policies that would promote the model of a
collaborative family where men and women share both providing and caring responsibilities. In
particular, Sweden has strong occupational segregation, and women are much more likely than
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men to work part-time. There needs to be a better division of the leaves and part-time work that
are associated with young children.
Henripin (2000) provides an interesting illustration of the contradictions associated with family
benefits when these are applied to two-earner families. Based on a family wage model, family
benefits seek to support the homemaker/ mother and the widow who is left behind. But
widowhood benefits are now seen as rights that apply to the pensioner and their spouse,
regardless of the spouse having been a housekeeper. Let us take two men who had the same
career, but one of their spouses was a mother and homemaker, while the other worked in the
labour market and had no children. If these two women die, the widowhood benefits apply to the
spouse from the two-earner family, while his colleague who raised children receives no such
benefits.
How should policies be structured in a two-worker family model? Some have proposed that the
community should absorb the caring activities, so that women would not have a double burden.
Duffy and Pupo (1996) call these “family friendly communities,” that harp back to extended
families, communes, or tribal communities where children were raised in common. From the
1988 National Child Care Survey and various other surveys of attitudes regarding care of infants
and very young children, there appears to be considerable interest on the part of parents to
absorb the main responsibility through leaves and part-time work (Beaujot, 1997, Ghalam,
1997).
While public child care needs to be part of the solution, it does not necessarily re-balance the
caring activities between women and men. I have proposed that we start our public education
system as of age three, following the recommendations of the Ontario Royal Commission on
Learning, and also joining what has effectively been policy in France for at least twenty years.
For infants, parental leaves have been extended from 26 weeks to a full year. This policy could
have been structured to encourage a half year of leave per parent, using a replacement rate of
90% with a much higher maximum than is now adopted. The same could apply to part-time
work. In Sweden, one parent has the right to work part-time, which typically means 30 hours per
week instead of the regular 40 hours, until the child is eight years old, and the right to return to
full-time work at any point. But Sweden is far from having solved the gender imbalance in work,
with women overwhelmingly being the ones working part-time. How about each parent having
the right to one year of part-time work, for each child, and the concomitant right to return to fulltime work. Of course, part-time work associated with young children would need to come with
full social benefits, as it does in Sweden.
The case of lone-parent families needs much further attention because the re-balancing of paid
and unpaid work across parents is here much more complex. Comparisons across some 20
countries suggests that several approaches are needed to reduce the economic disadvantages of
children in lone parent families (Beaujot and Liu, 2001b). Provisions that would discourage
teenage childbearing would have their importance, as would opportunities for lone mothers to
work. More important is the generosity of social expenditure applying to individuals and
especially to families with low income. This analysis also makes a case for provisions such as
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joint custody that encourage involvement on the part of the absent parent, and particular
arrangements like advance maintenance payments when the non-custodial parent is
incapacitated, along with special provisions for lone parents.
Canada does have some provisions for lone parents, especially the equivalent to married
deduction in income tax, which treats the first child of a lone-parent family as a dependent
spouse for purposes of tax deduction. There are also provisions that apply to low-income
families, and thus more often to lone-parent families, such as child tax benefits, greater access to
subsidized day care, and higher replacement rate in employment insurance for low-income
families who also receive child tax benefits. There are also enforcement provisions to collect
child support payments from non-resident parents who are in default. However, these provisions
are pale in comparison to advance maintenance payments, or paying higher benefits to lonemother families. For instance, in the case of lone parents, Denmark gives child benefits for one
more than the actual number of children. Collecting from non-resident parents does not solve the
problem when this parent is unable to pay.
As a society we have found means of accommodating for the death of parents, through life
insurance and adoption, and for the economic incapacity of parents if that incapacity occurs at
work, through worker’s compensation, employment insurance, and the disability provisions of
the Canada Pension Plan. However, we have not found means to accommodate when the
incapacity occurred in other circumstances. The provisions for low-income families solve part of
this problem, but advance maintenance and other specific provisions for lone parents have the
advantage of state support regardless of the circumstance that makes the non-resident parent
unable or unwilling to provide.
It is hard to put policy ideas into a few words. Clearly, family policy needs to relate both to
families and to the labour market. My main point is that there is need for more discussion of
provisions that would further modernize the family in the direction of co-providing and coparenting, and that would provide additional state support for lone parents.
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Table 1: Summary statistics on family change, Canada, 1941-1998
1941

1951

1961

1971

1976

1981

1986

1991

1996

1998

2.83
--

3.49
--

3.85
--

2.12
--

1.78
--

1.65
1.79

1.60
1.77

1.71
1.81

1.62
1.92

1.54
1.71

23.0
26.3

22.0
24.8

21.1
24.0

21.3
23.5

21.6
23.7

22.5
24.6

23.9
25.8

25.1
27.0

26.3
28.3

--

180

180

600

990

1180

1302

1235

1130

--

--

--

--

--

6.4

8.2

11.2

13.7

Births to non-married women
as a percent of all births

4.0

3.8

4.5

9.0

10.9

14.2

18.8

28.6

36.8

Proportion of TFR
to women aged 30+

41.7

37.7

33.2

27.8

24.9

26.9

30.7

33.9

38.6

9.8

9.8

11.4

13.2

14.0

16.6

18.8

20.0

22.3

Total fertility rate
Adjusted TFR*
Median age at first marriage
Brides
Grooms
Divorces per 100,00
married couples
Common-law couples as a
percent of all couples

Lone parent families as a
percent of all families
with children

1050

40.2

*Based on the Bongaart and Feeney corrections for changes in tempo.
Notes: For 1941-71 births to non-married women are "illegitimate births". The 1986 divorce rate is inflated due to the timing of
changes in the divorce law.
Source: Beaujot, 2000:89 and calculations by authors.

Table 2. Degrees, diplomas, and certificates granted, by field of study and sex, Canada, 1970-95
Male

Undergraduate
Female

% Female

Male

Graduate
Female

% Female

1970
1975
1980
1985
1990
1995

39,514
49,139
49,076
53,888
56,365
61,936

26,224
39,868
49,572
60,184
74,264
88,876

39.9
44.8
50.3
52.8
56.9
58.9

8,604
10,268
10,144
11,170
11,956
14,086

2,236
3,752
5,647
7,657
10,207
13,176

20.6
26.8
35.8
40.7
46.1
48.3

1970
1975
1980
1985
1990
1995

6,439
9,562
7,011
5,369
6,563
7,988

7,517
13,169
14,714
13,054
15,905
18,000

53.9
57.9
67.7
70.9
70.8
69.3

1,327
1,892
1,804
1,508
1,428
1,412

527
887
1,581
2,060
2,687
3,243

28.4
31.9
46.7
57.7
65.3
69.7

1970
1975
1980
1985
1990
1995

413
913
1,024
1,182
1,350
1,528

836
1,437
1,924
2,250
2,703
3,169

67.0
61.1
65.3
65.6
66.7
67.5

29
74
103
139
168
212

49
72
105
191
259
331

62.8
49.3
50.5
57.9
60.7
61.0

1970
1975
1980
1985
1990
1995
Agriculture/biological sciences
1970
1975
1980
1985
1990
1995
Social sciences
1970
1975

5,253
4,689
4,056
4,553
5,915
6,956

4,747
5,782
6,285
7,583
10,579
12,205

47.5
55.2
60.8
62.5
64.1
63.7

654
1,051
1,111
1,310
1,514
1,472

1,883
2,429
2,111
2,357
2,763
1,878

34.7
43.3
52.6
55.6
54.8
56.1

2,258
3,038
2,969
2,636
3,352
3,598

1,299
2,356
2,827
2,981
4,244
5,405

36.5
43.7
48.8
53.1
55.9
60.0

634
554
590
637
712
801

118
175
270
340
529
697

15.7
24.0
31.4
34.8
42.6
46.5

10,984
15,483

3,968
8,390

26.5
35.1

2,511
3,642

628
1,113

20.0
23.4

Total University

Education

Fine/applied arts

Humanities

1980
1985
1990
1995
Engineering/applied sciences
1970
1975
1980
1985
1990
1995
Health Professionals
1970
1975
1980
1985
1990
1995
Mathematics/physical sciences
1970
1975
1980
1985
1990
1995
Community College and Diplomas
1970-71
1974-75
1979-80
1984-85
1989-90
1994-95

17,724
20,705
23,255
24,521

13,118
21,066
28,876
34,501

42.5
50.4
55.4
58.5

4,006
4,321
4,471
5,177

1,851
2,634
3,573
4,410

31.6
37.9
44.4
46.0

4,214
5,138
7,348
8,297
7,190
7,839

66
137
609
1,056
1,110
2,060

1.5
2.6
7.7
11.3
13.4
20.8

1,198
1,158
1,231
1,766
1,753
2,445

19
47
85
188
252
517

1.6
3.9
6.5
9.6
12.6
17.5

1,780
2,455
2,485
2,376
2,504
2,574

2,888
3,461
4,515
5,683
6,530
7,550

61.9
58.5
64.5
70.5
72.3
74.5

424
434
423
589
710
887

155
258
461
623
964
1,462

26.8
37.3
52.1
51.4
57.6
62.2

3,047
3,237
3,231
5,818
4,930
5,386

643
897
1,297
2,464
2,057
2,436

17.4
21.7
28.6
29.8
29.4
31.1

1,245
1,098
959
1,142
1424
1,555

83
137
165
300
387
502

6.3
11.1
14.7
20.8
21.4
24.4

5,929
12,100
19,903
26,303
23,416
30,288

6,873
13,100
27,684
32,345
33,858
42,260

53.7
52.0
58.2
55.2
59.1
58.3

Notes: Total includes "unclassified" classification. Undergraduate degrees by discipline are based on University data for bachelor and
first professional degrees, as well as undergraduate diplomas and certificates. Graduate data by discipline are based on masters,
earned doctorates, and graduate diplomas and certificates.
Sources: Beaujot, 2000: 58-59.

Table 3. Labour force and income by sex and age, Canada 1980 and 2000
Male

1980
Female

Female/Male (%)

Male

2000
Female

Female/Male (%)

72.8
63.0
90.1
60.8

46.3
56.0
57.8
28.4

63.6
88.9
64.2
46.7

67.5
56.7
86.5
54.0

55.5
55.8
75.2
38.7

82.2
98.4
86.9
71.7

proportion of full-time employed among all employed
all
93.1
15-24
79.9
25-44
98.1
45+
95.4

74.0
71.7
76.8
71.4

79.5
89.7
78.3
74.9

89.7
62.9
95.6
92.3

72.7
48.6
78.7
75.2

81.1
77.2
82.3
81.5

proportion of full-time employed among population
all
67.8
15-24
50.4
25-44
88.4
45+
58.0

34.3
40.1
44.4
20.2

50.5
79.7
50.3
34.9

60.5
35.7
82.7
49.8

40.4
27.1
59.2
29.1

66.7
75.9
71.5
58.5

average working hours of full-time employed
all
43.2
15-24
41.8
25-44
43.6
45+
43.7

38.4
37.9
38.4
39.0

88.9
90.7
88.1
89.2

44.0
41.3
44.1
44.5

39.4
36.0
39.4
39.7

89.5
87.2
89.3
89.2

average working hours of all employed
all
15-24
25-44
45+

41.3
36.3
43.1
42.5

32.6
31.3
33.5
32.7

78.9
86.2
77.7
76.9

38.7
32
43.2
42.6

33.8
26.9
35.4
34.8

87.3
84.1
81.9
81.7

13,027
1,955
8,342
15,246
17,872
17,147

6,058
1,694
6,467
8,471
7,972
7,789

46.5
86.6
77.5
55.6
44.6
45.4

22,260
3,052
10,979
22,467
28,631
29,576

13,985
2,681
9,076
16,516
18,657
18,210

62.8
87.8
82.7
73.5
65.2
61.6

Employment rate
all
15-24
25-44
45+

Median after-tax income*
all
19 and under
20-24
25-34
35-44
45-54

Note:
* in 1980 and 1996

Source:
1. Statistics Canada, no. 13-210, 1980: 59; 1996: 105.
2. Survey of Consumer Finances.
3. Labour force historical review. 2000. Statistics Canada.

Table 4. Time use of total population, by sex, Canada, 1986, 1992, 1998
Average Hours per Day in Population Aged 15+
1986

1992

1998

Total productive activity
Paid work and education
Unpaid work

M
7.5
5.6
1.9

F
7.4
3.3
4.1

M
7.7
5.1
2.6

F
7.8
3.3
4.5

M
7.8
5.0
2.7

F
7.8
3.4
4.4

Personal Care

10.8

11.2

10.3

10.8

10.2

10.6

Leisure/ free time

5.7

5.3

6.0

5.5

6.0

5.6

Total

24.0

24.0

24.0

24.0

24.0

24.0

Sources:
1. Beaujot, 2000: 207; Statistics Canada, 1999, No 12F0080XIE, 1999: 5.
2. General Social Survey, 1986, 1992, 1998.

Table 5. Time use of population aged 25-44 by marital and parental status, by sex, Canada, 1998

Total productive activity
Paid work and education
Unpaid work

----------------------------------Hours per day----------------------------------Unmarried no
Married no
Married Parents
Unmarried
children
children
Parents
M
F
M
F
M
F
M
F
8.1
8.1
9.0
8.8
9.9
9.7
8.8
9.4
6.1
5.4
6.7
5.3
6.5
3.5
5.3
3.9
2.0
2.6
2.3
3.5
3.5
6.2
3.5
5.6

Personal care
Leisure/free time

9.8
6.1

10.0
5.9

9.8
5.3

10.4
4.8

9.7
4.3

10.1
4.2

9.8
5.5

10.1
4.4

Total

24.0

24.0

24.0

24.0

24.0

24.0

24.0

24.0

N=4365
Note: Married includes cohabiting.
Source: Special Tabulations from the Statistics Canada, 1998 General Social Survey.

Table 6. Predominance of models of husband-wife families in terms of the relative proportion
of paid and unpaid work by sex, Canada, 1992, 1998
Compare to
Compare to
husband,
husband, wife does
wife does
1992
1998
More paid Same paid Less paid More paid Same paid
Less paid
More unpaid
Men
4.1
13.6
52.9
4.2
15.5
48.1
Women
6.5
22.2
53.4
7.3
19.0
48.9
Average
5.3
17.9
53.1
5.7
17.2
48.5
Same unpaid
Men
Women
Average

2.8
1.9
2.4

5.2
4.2
4.7

7.6
2.4
5.0

1.0
2.9
1.9

6.7
4.8
5.7

7.4
3.6
5.5

Less unpaid
Men
Women
Average

3.7
4.0
3.9

5.4
2.9
4.2

4.7
2.5
3.6

5.0
5.7
5.3

4.7
4.4
4.5

7.5
3.5
5.5

Note: This table excludes couples where one or both are aged 65 or over. The sample size is 3598 in 1992 and 3794 in 1998.
Source: same as Table 5

Figure 1. Relative share of time in productive activities, women and men aged 15 and over, Canada, 1998

Note: Based on averages per capita.
Source: See Table 5.
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